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Abstract

Despite the vast material that has been written about the Second World War, most literature
mentions battleships in passing, giving little attention to a role that battleships filled- that of
naval gunfire support for amphibious landings. The literature regarding the Navy’s older,
obsolescent battleships such as the Texas is scarce. Using primary sources regarding the Texas
and the evolution of naval gunfire doctrine from the pre-war and wartime periods, this study
looks at the involvement of the Texas in the Second World War and how the Navy employed its
oldest battleships. The amphibious landings of the war provided a role in which a ship’s speed
and range became irrelevant when firing on fixed targets on an enemy beach. This work
provides a look at a little discussed, though widely used aspect of the Second World War and
helps further discussion regarding the evolution of the US navy.

United States Navy, USS Texas, Naval Gunfire, Battleship, Amphibious Warfare, Shore
Bombardment, World War Two, D-day, France
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1: Introduction
From the birth of the United States Navy ships-of-the-line were the spearhead of the
United States Navy. Reminiscent of their wooden-hulled and sail-powered predecessors,
American battleships were heavily armed and prepared to protect American interests in any
corner of the globe. In early 1941, America’s great battleships, though still the spearhead of the
Navy, were in a position of obsolescence. The first new American battleships since the 1920s
were commissioned in 1941 with main batteries of nine 16-inch guns and top speeds of twentyseven knots. The existing American battleships became comparably slow (top speeds were about
twenty knots) and outgunned with the 14-inch gun dominant among the old, slower ships.
America’s War Plan Orange originated in the first decade of the twentieth century under
President Theodore Roosevelt. Part of a series of war plans color coded to represent various
potential belligerents, Japan was given the designation Orange. War Plan Orange was America’s
joint army-navy strategy for war in the Pacific against Japan. From the first draft until
America’s declaration of war against Japan in 1941, war planners
revised and refined the plan. The basic concept of Orange was that the Japanese would
first target the Philippines, where American forces would hopefully hold out for several months.
Once the American fleet arrived in the Pacific, it would aid the American defenders until the US
Army arrived to save the defenders. The US fleet would fight the Japanese on the seas until a
major battlefleet action resulted in Japanese capitulation. Although War Plan Orange accurately
predicted many of the events of World War Two, a decisive battlefleet action against Japan never
occurred.
As the Second World War evolved, old American battleships served in three main roles:
convoy escorts, anti-aircraft artillery, and naval gunfire support for amphibious landings. As the
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Marines advanced across the Pacific island by island and the Army invaded North Africa and
Europe, providing naval gunfire support for the invasion landings became the main task of the
older battleships.
Following the service of the battleship USS Texas and its role in the Atlantic theater’s
largest amphibious landing, the invasion of France, this paper describes how the United States
Navy readjusted the traditional roles of its battleships, particularly those from the early part of
the twentieth century, in the midst of war. By studying action reports, general orders, and other
prewar and wartime documents, and by looking at several secondary sources which address the
fleet problems and fleet landing exercises, we can understand how the US Navy planned to
employ, and how they actually did employ, the battleships of the fleet in the next war. Finally,
we can see the development of naval shore bombardment in support of amphibious operations
during the first few years of the Second World War. Although the focus is on one ship, it is
representative of the four oldest battleships which participated in major actions in the Atlantic
Theater. 1 The Texas was present at every major land invasion and thus can be regarded as a fair
representation of the actions of the other battleships in the fleet. Even though she never
participated in the role for which she was designed, the Texas earned five Battle Stars for her
participation in the Second World War.

1

These four ships were the USS Arkansas (BB33), USS New York (BB34), USS Texas (BB35) and USS Nevada
(BB36).
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2: The Origins of American Battleships
Despite the fact that by the 1880s, the American Navy had had nearly nine decades of
distant naval operations, Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler (1882-1885) spoke against
the building of battleships by denouncing any global missions for the United States Navy. He
argued that ships necessary for global missions were not the type of continental coast defense
vessels America needed. He asserted that the focus should be on economical defense of the
coast by monitors, as it had been since the Civil War. The call to build modern ships for the
American navy had its origins in the 1870s, and was strengthened by many factors in the
following decades. During the1880s, many young officers in the Navy began to push for the
development of new ships. Lobbying by naval officers showed Congress that America needed
modern ships. When the British announced they would build ten steel battleships with large
guns, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the Navy’s intellectual leader, urged the building of an
American battleship fleet.
Many historians, such as William McBride, have put the origins of the American
battleship under the administration of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy (1889-1893). 2
Influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 16601890, “Tracy called for the creating of a fighting force based upon ‘sea-going battleships.’” 3
Initially all the United States could provide was the armored ABCD ships, the Atlanta, Boston,
Chicago, and Dolphin; and “four modern heavy cruisers: Texas, Maine, New York, and
Olympia.” 4 These were inferior to the battleships under construction in Great Britain and did
not satisfy Tracy’s desire for a strong American Navy. After a disastrous typhoon in the Pacific,

2

William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore & London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
3
McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 42.
4
Ibid.

3

which practically destroyed American naval power, Tracy had a stronger argument for building
battleships. This ultimately resulted in the Naval Bill of 1890, which authorized $18 million for
three new battleships. Thus began the reign of the battleship in the American Navy.
Another vital factor in battleship building was the Endicott Board, led by Secretary of
War William Endicott. Appointed in 1885 by President Grover Cleveland, the Endicott Board
was a mix of army and navy officers and civilians brought together to investigate American
coastal defenses. Their report in 1886 recommended that twenty-six coastal locations to have
updated armament along with floating support batteries, submarine mines and other updated
defenses. Funding for the recommended projects began in 1890, and as a result established a
system of government contracts to the private sector for building. This combination of public
and private policy meant that even during depressions the government would keep factories
operating. Therefore, despite an economic depression in 1893, factories were still capable of
large scale production needed to produce battleships authorized in 1895. 5
President Theodore Roosevelt helped cement the battleship as the centerpiece of the
American Navy with the cruise of the “Great White Fleet” in 1907-1909. Sixteen battleships,
along with various escorts, cruised around the world. The fleet covered roughly 43,000 miles
and made a total of twenty port calls on six continents. 6 The impact of this cruise lingered into
the interwar period and arguably beyond. It served to deliver the message that “the United States
had come of age as a world naval power” and that the battlefleet, and therefore the battleship,
was America’s new first line of defense, capable of meeting challenges at any corner of the
globe. 7

5

Allan R. Millett & Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York: The Free Press, 1984).
“The Great White Fleet,” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed September 21, 2012,
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq42-1.htm
7
Millett & Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 320.
6
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3: Building the USS Texas
The Newport Conference held in 1908 resulted in the creation of two new classes of
battleships, the Wyoming and New York. 8 In his work on American battleships, Norman
Friedman explains that the largest influence on the design of the New York and Wyoming classes
was the need for larger caliber main guns. Friedman further argues that it was the belief at the
time that the international standard would rise above twelve inches. The Navy knew it must
equip the newer ships with larger guns, as the British were known to be constructing a 13.5-inch
gun, and the Germans were expected to abandon their 11-inch guns for a larger weapon. Three
ship designs with various gun sizes and numbers were drawn up. The choice in final design had
to consider the capabilities of ship yards, dry docks and harbors.
In March, 1909, Congress authorized two new Wyoming class battleships, the USS
Wyoming (BB 32) and the USS Arkansas (BB 33.) 9 The Arkansas and Wyoming were still
armed with 12-inch guns, though a larger and more powerful variation than previous ships.
Although these new 12-inch guns were powerful and accurate, the General Board, in charge of
battleship design, still wanted a 14-inch gun. 10 Upon successful testing of a 14-inch gun in
January of 1910, the General Board made the decision to arm the next two battleships with the
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Battleship classes were traditionally named after the first ship in the class. The Wyoming was Battleship 32, or
BB32, therefore the class was named the Wyoming class, and consisted of Battleships 32 and 33, the Wyoming and
the Arkansas.
9
In 1920, after the confusion in World War I regarding mailing correspondence and shipping parts to ships, the
acting Secretary of the Navy Admiral Robert E. Coontz approved General Order No. 541. This order created a
standardized system of alpha-numeric symbols with which to identify ships by type and number. For example, the
Texas was BB35, the thirty-fifth authorized battleship. Each craft type had such a designation, which was termed a
hull classification symbol. This system remains in place today.
10
The General Board was a body formed to advise the Secretary of the Navy on policy and strategy matters. It was
in existence from 1900 to 1950. Members were officers of senior to mid-grade rank. Part of the responsibility of
this group was discussion and decision making in regards to shipbuilding.
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14-inch gun. 11 In 1910, the USS Texas (BB 35) was authorized by Congress as part of the New
York class of battleships.
The Texas was designed to have ten 14”/45 guns in five twin mounts, two forward and
three aft. With each of the five turrets weighing 532 tons, the new 14-inch guns resulted in
construction challenges and an overall increase in ship displacement. The 14-inch guns
outweighed the 12-inch guns by roughly nine tons and the corresponding weight of the shells and
powder needed further increased displacement. Two reciprocating engines made the Texas more
efficient than earlier turbine powered battleships despite a heavier displacement. One change that
had to be made was to the armor. The formula for determining a ship’s armor is that a ship must
have protection against a shell of the same caliber that its guns fire. With the increase from the
12 to 14-inch gun, the armor on the Texas was increased from the Wyoming class designs.
The Texas and New York were unique in that they were to only two battleships in which
14-inch ammunition was stored and hoisted in a nose down position. With the exception of a
manual breech, all operational functions of the gun systems were electrical. Maximum elevation
was 15° and maximum range was 23,000 yards. Ten magazines held roughly one-thousand 14inch shells. Upon commissioning in 1914, the Texas also had twenty-one 5”/51 single mounted
guns. There were four 21-inch torpedo tubes in the hull.
The hull was double bottomed, and the inner bottom went to the third deck. This created
a solid structure where the side belt armor was mounted. Face-hardened armor was used on the
conning tower, barbettes, turret faces and fronts, vertical side armor, and some bulkheads. Non
face-hardened armor was used for other locations. The ship was powered by two steam powered

11

The General Board was created by the Secretary of the Navy in 1900. Descended from the Strategy Board that
had planned wartime operations, the General Board was solely an advisory group. The Board was made up of naval
officers, and after a reform in 1908, the Board on Construction was eliminated, it was given responsibility for ship
characteristics. The General Board was responsible for the characteristics of every battleship from 1908 on.
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engines. Fourteen boilers supplied steam to the engines. At the time of construction, the design
of the Texas was: 12
Design Displacement
Overall Length
Waterline Length 13
Beam
Hull Depth
SHP (trial) 14
Speed (trial)
Main Battery
Secondary Battery
Endurance
Boilers
Coal
Compliment

27,000 tons
573 feet
565 feet
95 feet 3 inches
48 feet 8 ¼ inches
28,850
21 knots
10 – 14in/45
21 – 5in/51
9,600 nm @ 10 kts
3,700 nm @ 20 kts
14 coal burning
2960.4 tons
58 officers
994 enlisted men

A ship’s design is based on its intended use, and the battleships commissioned between
1912 and 1916 reflected the new strategic direction of the United States Navy. The new, forward
strategy of the Navy required heavily armed ships with long ranges. As a result, the Texas, upon
commissioning had a range of 7684 nautical miles at a speed of twelve knots, as compared to the
North Dakota (BB29) which had a range of 6560 nautical miles at a speed of ten knots upon
commissioning in 1910. 15

12

Norman Friedman, U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute,
1984), 436.
13
The waterline length is significant due to its relevance to a ship’s speed. The speed of a ship is partially
determined by her length at the waterline, making any longer length above that line irrelevant to speed.
14
SHP is the shaft horse power, the power measurement for steam turbines.
15
Friedman, U.S. Battleships, 432, 436.
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4: 1920s Battleship Modernization
In 1922, during the Washington Naval Conference, representatives from the United
States, the British Empire 16, France, Italy, and Japan signed the Five-Power Treaty, agreeing “to
limit their respective naval armament.” 17 In his opening address, American Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes summarized the goal of the conference: “The world looks to this
Conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament.” 18
In the first article of Chapter I of the Five-Power Treaty, “The contracting Powers agree to limit
their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty.” 19 The following nineteen
articles set out provisions for the suspension of capital shipbuilding programs; the retention,
scrapping, replacement and tonnage limits of both capital ships and aircraft carriers; capital ship
gun limits; ship conversion; merchant ship armament; giving, selling or transferring of ships to a
signing nation. Finally, the United States, Great Britain and Japan agreed “that the status quo at
the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall
be maintained in their territories and possessions.” 20
While the limits placed on shipbuilding greatly affected the American Navy, perhaps the
most influential article of the Treaty was Article XIX regarding the status quo of fortifications
and naval bases. For the United States, that was all “possessions west of the 180th meridian- that
is, the Philippines, Guam, Wake and western Aleutians.” 21 This provision affected the revised
War Plan Orange. A main point of Orange was the importance of bases in the Pacific to defend
16

Representatives from the British Empire included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India.
“Conference on the Limitation of Armament,” accessed 25 July 2012, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/prewar/1922/nav_lim.html
18
Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, American Naval Policy and the World Scene,
1918-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 152.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Edward Miller, War Plan Orange, The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1991), 75.
17
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against Japan, and various islands had been proposed as bases by planners in the early part of the
twentieth century. Before the Washington Naval Treaty, Guam and Luzon had been proposed,
but the treaty kept them from being developed as major bases. Work on fortifications in the
Philippines was also halted due to Article XIX.
Due to the limitations put on base building and fortification, the US Navy had to find
solutions to fighting without bases in distant seas. Solutions had to be found to solve problems
of supply, long ranges and endurance. One of these solutions was to modernize the existing
battleship fleet. In his book on War Plan Orange, Edward Miller argued that “The great western
base was a terrible strategic idea,” as Japanese close proximity would likely destroy such bases,
as did happen with the Philippines. The result was that the effects of the battleship
modernization, such as increased fuel storage and longer sailing ranges, would be vital in
fighting the Second World War. 22
As a part of the modification of War Plan Orange, the Texas underwent major
modifications from 1925-1927. Modernization would allow the older ships to fulfill the Navy’s
need for ships with long sailing ranges that were more sustainable and reliable. One of the most
important modifications to ships such as the Texas was the conversion from coal to oil.
The largest structural modification was the widening of the hull. Originally built with a
95’3” beam, 5’5” blisters added to each side increased the beam to 106’1” – the widest possible
beam which would still allow the ship unrestricted passage in the Panama Canal. 23 These
blisters were added to increase torpedo protection. Any torpedo that made contact would have to
penetrate both the inner and outer hull before it could cause damage to vital parts. These blisters
could also be used to store oil if emergency reserves were required, or they could be flooded with

22

Miller, War Plan Orange, 76.
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water. This feature allowed the crew of the Texas to flood the outboard blister on D-day in order
to get the required elevation to hit a target far inland.
The original fourteen coal boilers went to the scrapyard. Replacing them were just six
Bureau Express oil-fired boilers. Previously, fourteen boilers had been divided between four
firerooms; with the reduction in the number of boilers, only three firerooms were needed. The
last fireroom was overhauled and divided into a plotting and secondary battery switchboard
operations, store rooms and four oil tanks. With fewer boilers in each fireroom, more space was
available for damage control. The reduction in the number of boilers also resulted in the need for
only one smoke stack, as opposed to the existing two.
With the modernization of the boilers, the fuel storage capacity of the Texas increased.
Even with the modification of the third deck coal storage spaces into crew quarters, fuel storage
grew from 1,900 tons maximum of coal to 4,600 tons maximum of oil. 24 The change in the
boilers and the fuel oil storage capacity increased the Texas’ endurance from 7,684 nautical
miles at twelve knots to 15,400 nautical miles at ten knots. 25
Another part of the work done during the modernization of the Texas was to strengthen
armor in two locations. The three inch armor on the second deck, which was made by two layers
of 1½-inch plating, was thickened with the addition of 5/8 inch plating on the existing deck. The
five turret roofs were similarly thickened.
The Navy had plans to increase the elevation of the main battery guns from 15° to 20°. It
was unclear as to whether or not this modification would fall under the restrictive clause of the
Washington Treaty. 26 Plans were created to perform the elevation increase when the First Lord
of the Admiralty denied that the British were increasing the elevation of their guns. If the United
24

Friedman, U.S. Battleships, 436-437.
Ibid.
26
Freidman, U.S. Battleships, 189.
25
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States did so, it would indeed violate the reconstruction clause. Despite a difference of opinion,
the American government cancelled the plans. 27 The idea did not die with this incident, and the
topic would come up again in the 1930s as world events hinted at war.

27

Friedman, U.S. Battleships, 191.
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5: Battleships in the Interwar Fleet Problems and Fleet Landing Exercises
The United States Navy had been conducting fleet exercises, which were termed fleet
problems, since 1889. Fleet problems provided an opportunity for the Navy to address various
strategic, operational, and tactical questions. In what would become the interwar period of 19201940, many of the problems would address assumptions laid out in War Plan Orange. Often
eerily foreshadowing engagements that occurred in the Second World War, planners, officers,
and sailors were able to gain important knowledge that would help the eventual Allied victory.
Some new options such as the use of battleships for amphibious landing support were
overlooked by naval officers. Problems for the battleships focused on convoy escort and tactical
exercises such as battleline maneuvers and attacks on carriers. Some of the joint exercises
conducted by the Army, Marine Corps and Navy resulted in naval bombardment covering shore
landings. During the 1927 Joint Army-Navy exercise, naval forces that included battleships
“bombarded” the defenses of the Panama Canal. The joint critique of the exercise ruled the
bombardment ineffective due to air strikes. 28
The Marine Corps put more focus on developing naval gunfire in support of amphibious
landings. From 1935-1939, the Marine Corps’ Fleet Marine Force conducted Fleet Landing
Exercises (FLEX). 29 The purpose of these exercises was to test the doctrine in the Tentative
Manual for Landing Operations. These five FLEXs also represent the majority of
experimentation with naval gunfire providing shore bombardment. With the idea fixed that
naval shore bombardment was to be equated to field artillery, the main questions regarding the
28

Albert Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War, The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940, (Newport: Naval War College
Press, 2010).
29
“A History of U.S. Fleet Landing Exercises” by B.W. Bally, Lt. Col., USMC; “Gunfire Support in Fleet Landing
Exercises” by David L. Nutter, Lt. Com., US Navy; “Landing Operations and Equipment” by William F. Royall,
Lt., US Navy; “Pictorial Record of Landing Boat Development” by William F. Royall, Lt., US Navy; September
1939. Historical Amphibious File; Box 2, Folder 73. Historical Amphibious File; Gray Research Center, United
States Marine Corps Research Library; Quantico, Virginia.
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doctrine were type of projectile and the ability of a ship’s flat trajectory gun to hit a target on the
reverse slope of a landing area.
With the understanding that naval shore bombardment should be carried out in the same
manner as a field artillery bombardment on land, initial doctrine leaned toward a barrage style of
bombardment. The first three FLEXs (1935-1937) tested this doctrine. It was determined by the
end of the third FLEX that the doctrine was sound. FLEX 4 in January-March of 1938 tested the
accuracy of destroyer guns against pinpoint targets. After Tarawa in late 1943, pre-arranged,
pinpoint target firing became the doctrine for naval shore bombardment. But in 1938 it was just
another experiment in a training exercise. In FLEX 5 in January-March of 1939 shore fire
control parties were again thoroughly tested, and more emphasis was placed on delivering fire on
designated areas and providing deep supporting fire.
Other important aspects of naval shore bombardment were tested during the 1935-1939
FLEXs. Testing was done on the shell type and charge amounts. It was decided that high
explosive projectiles were preferable to armor piercing, but that conclusion was drawn by hitting
only wooden targets. Testing was not done on more realistic targets, that is, on concrete bunkers.
Comments in the review of gunfire support in the exercises written by Lieutenant Commander
David Nutter, USN, hint at planners believing amphibious landings would be contested on the
beach by manpower. Therefore, the navy tested the effects of bombing against personnel and the
effectiveness of effects of various projectiles. Both air spotting and shore spotting were tested.
The ability of both spotters and ships to quickly shift targets was another important experiment
of all five FLEXs. Although many important lessons were learned from the FLEXs, naval
gunfire doctrine was in its infancy, and important changes would not be made until after the
experiences at Tarawa.

13

During the interwar period other battleship capabilities were recognized. One idea
regarding battleships that proved to be true in the coming war was the strength of battleships
against air attacks, especially in open water. 30 This was due in part to the structural strength of
the ships and to large numbers of anti-aircraft installed on these ships. Older ships such as the
Texas, which were not initially supplied with large numbers of anti-aircraft weapons, were
modified and given increased anti-aircraft batteries, especially when assigned to the Pacific
theater. In the case of the Texas, in 1927 it had eight 3”/50 Mk 21 guns. By 1941 two more had
been added. By December of 1944, the Texas had also been outfitted with forty-four 20mm
Mk10 guns and ten 40mm quad mounts. 31 The strength of battleships against aerial attack was
further exploited during the Second World War, as battleships would often be put in between the
carrier forces and the likely direction of enemy attacks. They provided irresistible targets to
airmen, but were able fight off attacks with a high success rate. Battleships’ invulnerability to air
attacks also made them a perfect addition to landing bombardment forces.
What is evident in the fleet problems of the 1930s is that by December of 1941, naval
minds still believed that battles would be won or lost by ship-to-ship engagements. That carrier
launched planes could provide support of amphibious landings, protection of fleets could be
strengthened by destroyers and cruisers, but that battleships were still key to naval warfare.
Although the US Navy had used battleships as support for carriers in some fleet problems, and
carrier tactics and deployment had been greatly advanced, the attack on Pearl Harbor would turn
the tide of naval warfare and forever change the role of battleships in the United States Navy.

30

In his book, To Train the Fleet for War, Albert Nofi explains that sixteen battleships or battle cruisers (including
all participants in WWII, not just Allied) were sunk during the war due to air attacks. Twelve of those were moored
or at anchor when hit. Contrast that to the nine battleships sunk by surface gunnery or torpedo attacks.
31
A full chart of the change in armament on the Texas is in Appendix E.
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6: Naval Gunfire in Support of Amphibious Landings in the Interwar Period
“Battleships, as a type, are designed for the purpose of inflicting maximum damage upon
an enemy while, at the same time, withstanding punishment. The development of skill in
battleship evolution and maneuver, singly or in combinations, has, as its ultimate objective, the
attachment and maintenance of relative positions favorable for the exercise of these functions.” 32
This introduction from the 1938 Battleships, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet Bulletin of Tactical
Information, summarized the battleship’s place in the interwar age. Although the bulletins from
the 1930s focus on battleships as a ship of the line, as early as 1928 the Navy considered the use
of battleships to provide naval gunfire for amphibious landings.
Speaking to a group at the Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia, in March of
1928, Commander H. M. Lammers, USN, addressed some of the issues of naval gunfire in
support of landing operations. Lammers opened with the truth that being separated from all of
the world’s great powers by vast oceans, a decisive blow in any future war would have to involve
taking advanced bases in order to shorten the distance between our forces and the enemy (War
Plan Orange basics). His speech was entitled “Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing” and
discussed the potential of using existing ships to cover amphibious landings. 33
Lammers, like so many at the time, focused on comparing naval shore bombardment to
land artillery bombardments based on the experiences of the First World War. The doctrine of
neutralizing an area with saturating fire was practiced in the FLEXs of the 1930s. Although the
final two exercises in 1938-1939 included the practice of hitting some specific targets of
32

“Battleships, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet Bulletin of Tactical Information 1938;” Registered Publications Section;
U.S. Navy Technical Publications 1901-1960; Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Record
Group 38; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
33
Commander H.M. Lammers, USN, “Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing.” Speech to the Marine Corps
Schools Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, 2 March 1928; Strategic Plans Division Records; Lectures and
Speeches (Series I); Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Record Group 38; National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD.
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opportunity, the doctrine of firing on pre-assigned, pinpoint targets did not become the standard
doctrine until the experiences from the landings at Tarawa. What Lammers’ speech represents is
one of the early efforts of the Navy and Marine Corps to discuss naval shore bombardment, and
the many problems which would need to be answered. The FLEX problems which came in the
following decade tested many types of ammunition, spotting, and particulars of hitting targets
out of site, i.e. hitting targets on the reverse slope of a hill. Certain arguments made by Lammers
continued to be a point of discussion until the outbreak of war. These issues included types of
ships for bombardment, types of spotting, and ammunition, and would be tested and tried even
through the Second World War.
One particular argument Lammers made was that battleships were less vulnerable to
shore battery fire than other types of ships and suggested their combination of large caliber guns
and armor made them ideal for participation in shore bombardment. The Texas would indeed
prove this point in post D-day action against a German battery off of Cherbourg. On 25 June
1944 the Texas took two direct hits from German shore batteries. One shell, believed to be eight
inches in caliber, hit the conning tower. It sheared off the top of director three, dropping it onto
the fire control tower. It then exploded against the longitudinal frame of the foremast. This
explosion resulted in an upwards blast, which sheared off floor plates in the navigation bridge
and rendered “steering gear, compasses, engine room telegraph, engine revolution indicator, I.C.
circuits, electric cables and voice tubes” severed and useless. 34 Despite this hit, which also
resulted in eleven casualties, including one killed, the Texas continued to fire on its targets.
During the same bombardment period, the Texas took a hit from a 240mm shell, which
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penetrated between forward frames and fell onto the deck of a room in Warrant Officers’
country. Fortunately for the crew of the Texas, this shell did not detonate. The shell was,
however, left in place for the duration of the engagement and removed upon the ship’s return to
Portsmouth, England. 35
Despite his belief that battleships could withstand hits during shore bombardment, and
despite his belief that their large caliber guns could be effective, Lammers had some doubts as to
the extent of battleships’ effectiveness. One concern of naval officials since the limitations
placed on capital shipbuilding in the Five-Power Treaty was gun elevation. During the 1920s
modernization, naval officials wanted to increase elevation of the main battery on the Texas from
15° to 20°, but were denied this change by the treaties. Lammers also discusses this handicap in
his 1928 talk at Quantico. Although Lammers discusses elevation as a means to increase range
with a decrease in velocity in order to prolong gun life, the topic was one of continued discussion
throughout the prewar years. 36 Lammers’ further concerns with battleships included the
accuracy and range of the guns, the capabilities of fire control, and whether or not naval
ordnance would be effective. On all points, his concerns proved to be unmerited. Developments
in the interwar period improved fire control, and with the improvement of aviation, and
especially aircraft radios, aerial spotting became quite dependable. Naval ordnance proved to be
lethal to coastal defenses, especially to smaller pillboxes and machine gun nests. As for the
range and accuracy of the guns, naval shore bombardment continued to be used and refined
during the war, which proved these were problems which could be overcome.
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7: Gun Elevation – a Turning Point
Unrestrained by treaties during the fall of 1939, navy officials discussed making changes
to the battleships of Battleship Division Five, which consisted of the Arkansas, Wyoming, New
York, and Texas. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, deliberated with
directors of various divisions, such as the War Plans Division and Fleet Maintenance Division
about increasing the elevation of the main battery guns on the four older ships to 30°. The
Bureau recommended that the Wyoming was not worth modernizing, and it so it remained a
training ship. 37 The elevation increase work was expected to take twenty-one months for the
New York and Texas and twenty-six months for the Arkansas.
From the beginning of these discussions some navy officers thought that the current state
of world affairs made it unwise to put these ships out of commission for lengthy periods. In
another memo from November of 1939, the Director, War Plans Division, states that the three
ships in question represented one-fifth of the US battleships, but that by the time alterations
could be made, the North Carolina and Washington would be finished. 38 Six more battleships
might be available just as soon. With the addition of these eight new battleships, the relative
value of the Arkansas, New York and Texas would materially decrease. 39 The Director, War
Plans Division, made two important arguments in his November 1939 memo that:
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(a) Elevation of the guns would permit these vessels to be in the battle line, which
they cannot do now. In this connection, it may be pointed out that the
Japanese Navy now has 18 capital ships, built and building (10 built and 8
building), whereas, even with these three vessels, we have only 23 (15 built
and 8 building).
(b) As escort for Fleet train, or for important merchant convoys, or for general
protection of communication lines against raids, the increased elevation plus
efficient A.A. guns would eliminate the handicaps the NEW YORK, TEXAS,
and ARKANSAS now suffer in comparison with 8” gun high elevation
cruisers and would permit efficient defense against aircraft. As the vessels are
now, their value for the above purposes is doubtful. 40
At the time these two points were considered advantages to altering the old battleships. In 1940,
“in view of the present international situation,” the Chief of Naval Operations decided not to
have gun elevation work done on the Arkansas, New York and Texas. The decision to not
elevate the guns on the three oldest battleships left these ships with a severe disadvantage. They
could not keep up with a modern battleline due to their slow speeds. Without the increase in gun
elevation, their shorter range capabilities might prove fatal in any surface engagement.
Battleships served in a variety of roles during the Second World War. Although over half
the US Navy battleships were too slow for the carrier force, they still filled vital roles. The
possibility of nighttime engagements was still open to the older ships, as darkness was a great
equalizer. In the final ship to ship engagement of World War Two, older American battleships
proved themselves more than capable. In late October of 1944, the nighttime battle at Surigao
Strait showed that the old battleships could still fight. The battleline of Rear Admiral Jesse
Oldendorf’s Task Group 77.2, was comprised of six old battleships, five of them Pearl Harbor
survivors. They were California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia. The
sixth ship was the Mississippi, which had been in Iceland on patrols in December of 1941. These
battleships, the newest of which, the West Virginia, had been commissioned in 1923, were not
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handicapped by low gun elevations like the Arkansas, New York, Texas, and Nevada. In the last
great ship-to-ship battle of World War II, the battle line of old ships, led by Rear Admiral
George Weyler, performed what every battleship commander dreamed of: they capped the
Japanese T. 41 Hemmed in by the islands of the strait, the American battleships, along with
cruisers, destroyers, and patrol torpedo boats, decimated the Japanese force of fourteen
battleships, destroyers, and cruisers.
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8: World War Two- The Beginning
In December of 1941, the United States Navy had seventeen battleships: Arkansas, New
York, Texas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Arizona, New Mexico, Mississippi, Idaho,
Tennessee, California, Colorado, Maryland, West Virginia, North Carolina, and Washington. 42
The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor cut that number cut down to nine operational ships. Of
those damaged at Pearl Harbor, all but the Arizona and Oklahoma were returned to service by
January 1944. 43 Commissioned in the spring of 1941, the North Carolina and Washington were
the newest battleships in the American fleet.
Thus at the start of the Second World War, US Navy had a serious deficiency in
battleships. The new, fast battleships, the first of which were the USS North Carolina (BB 55)
and the USS Washington (BB 56), both commissioned in 1941, joined the growing carrier task
forces. A further eight new battleships commissioned by the Navy were all fast battleships
whose speeds increased from twenty-seven to thirty-three knots by the time USS Iowa (BB 61)
began service. With maximum speeds at around twenty knots, the older battleships could no
longer keep up with the fast carrier forces, nor would they be able to keep up speed with the
newer battleships, whose top speed, like the carriers, was between twenty-six knots and thirtythree knots. 44
With a large majority of the battleship force limited by slow speeds, the Navy sought a
new role for the old battleships, whose top speeds were at best seven to thirteen knots slower
42
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than their new counterparts. Despite the belief of senior naval officials that older ships, such as
the Texas, would not be able to provide adequate protection as convoy escorts, they were already
part of the Neutrality Patrol ordered by President Roosevelt on 5 September 1939 to deter Axis
presence US waters. 45
In 1939 the Atlantic Squadron was formed. Commanded by Rear Admiral Alfred
Johnson, the Atlantic Squadron was comprised of the four oldest battleships in the US Navy, the
Wyoming, Arkansas, New York and Texas, a division of heavy cruisers, Destroyer Squadron 10,
and the aircraft carrier Ranger. On February 1, 1941, the Atlantic Squadron was organized under
Admiral Ernest King as the Atlantic Fleet. By 1940, battleship patrols, reaching far out into the
Atlantic were carried out in order to deter Axis raiders and U-boats. These sweeps against the
German raiders increased in 1941, as the situation grew worse for the Allies after the fall of
France and the German occupation of French ports. The Texas continued to run convoy escorts
through the first two years of full American involvement in the Second World War.
By November 1942, the Navy began to use the Arkansas, Texas, and New York for a
different task: providing naval gunfire support for amphibious landings. Covering first the
Allied landing in North Africa, this new role led these three older battleships to the shores of
North Africa, northern and southern France, and the Pacific islands of Okinawa and Iwo Jima
where their fire support joined with the new battleships to aid thousands of American soldiers,
sailors and Marines who assaulted enemy shores. For the older, slower ships, naval gunfire
support became the focus of their wartime employment.

The Texas would gain significant

experience in this new role over the next three years, eventually participating in almost every
major amphibious landing in the European Theater.
45

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol.1, The Battle of the
Atlantic (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1947), 14.

22

9: Evolution of Naval Gunfire in Amphibious Operations in WWII
“Our past conception of the futility of Naval Gunfire was based on the lessons of
Gallipoli. However, the technical advances in naval ordnance installations and naval gunnery
since World War I have not been fully appreciated.” 46 This quote from Marine Corps General
Order No. 6-43 (10 September 1943) acknowledged the challenge of improving naval gunfire in
support of amphibious landings. The first amphibious landing on Guadalcanal on August 7,
1942, was covered by carrier-based air support and cruisers as practiced during fleet exercises.
Although the initial landings allowed American forces to establish a force beachhead on
Guadalcanal in two days, it would take twenty-six weeks of intense fighting on land, air, and sea
to secure the island. 47 Although there was continuous discussion of naval shore bombardment
doctrine, serious changes did not come until the landings at Tarawa in November 1943.
As early as August 18, 1942, the Commander Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet was in the
midst of the discussion on improving naval shore bombardment doctrine. Major Frederick
Henderson of the Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, at Camp Elliott, California was
an early exponent of naval gunfire support 48

A memo dated August 18, 1942, written by Major

Henderson and sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, had an enclosure compared land and naval
gun forces. Major Henderson was submitting the enclosure for “consideration and
experiment.” 49 Henderson’s basic premise states:
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The Fire Support Groups of the Attack Force are the Field Artillery of the
Landing Force until the Landing Force Artillery is ashore and in operation.
Therefore the assignment and employment of the Fire Support Groups during the
preparation and support of Landing Force should follow current field artillery
doctrine as nearly as practicable. 50
The current doctrine was “to deliver a short overwhelming volume of fire on targets selected for
neutralization.” 51 The duration of fire was to be two minutes in length at a rapid rate. All guns
in a battery were to fire at one range during this two minute period, and all batteries were to fire
at the same range, regardless if they were offset. 52 This concept was not universally accepted.
The Marine Corps had already been experimenting with pre-planned, pinpoint targets during
FLEXs. The Commanding General, Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet at Camp Elliott,
California, responded to these ideas by saying: “…this office does not agree that the two (2)
minutes of fire will achieve neutralization. This time is arrived at because it is the time required
for naval artillery to equal in explosive the land artillery fire to cover an area.” 53 He also
acknowledged that that until the shore bombardment doctrine could be tested in combat, the
discussion on length of fire was just opinion. 54 This presumption was correct. The initial
doctrine of short bursts of fire, expected to saturate and neutralize an area, were found with the
experiences in the Pacific to be ineffective. Tarawa revealed that destructive, pinpoint firing on
targets was more effective than a traditional land artillery style bombardment for neutralization.
Due to the lack of actual practice and experience, gunnery officers had to calculate the
potential effectiveness of naval gunfire. One challenge with these calculations was that the
effectiveness of naval guns was compared to, and estimated by, field artillery effects. For
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example, the 14-inch guns on the Texas were considered comparable to an 8-inch howitzer.
Thus, naval shore gunnery was not shaped by actual capabilities, but by comparison with
existing field artillery effects.
In September 1943, the Headquarters Fifth Amphibious Corps issued a new General
Order 6-43, “Naval Gunfire Support in Landing Operations.” 55 No longer considered “black
magic,” the General Order from September 1943 states that “there is little reason to doubt the
usefulness of naval gunfire in present day landing operations in the critical phase during which
time artillery is not available….” 56 It was also stated in Annex C of the General Order that:
Naval gunfire has certain distinct inherent advantages. Ship’s batteries are always
in position and ready to fire due to their fixed installation within the ship. Their
ammunition supply is capable of functioning at all times up to the limit of the
amount carried aboard. They have a more rapid rate of fire than any field artillery
of comparable caliber. When hydrographic conditions permit flank firing
positions, enfilade fire may be delivered. 57
With the established opinion that naval gunfire was then a critical aspect of modern day
warfare, the General Order contained the following requirements of naval gunfire support:
a.

The requirements of Naval Gunfire support are based on the following:
(1) Sufficient gunfire capabilities to neutralize probable targets on the front
and flanks of the landing beaches selected.
(2) Sufficient gunfire capabilities to neutralize known and suspected enemy
batteries.
(3) Sufficient cruisers or destroyers with modern indirect fire control
installations to furnish direct gunfire support to each assault infantry
battalion.
b. The requirements of gunfire support enumerated above may be met in most
situations by the assignment of the following gunfire supporting ships to each
assault team.
(1) One squadron of 1500-2200 ton destroyers (8 or 9 ships).
(2) Two heavy cruisers (10,000 ton light cruisers).
(3) One battleship (any class).
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These classes of ships are of modern type with high fire power and excellent
fire control installations. 58
The general order continued by giving three phases of execution for naval gunfire
support. These three phases would only be slightly modified by 1944 when they are listed in the
Allied Naval Assault Gunnery Instructions: 59
Landing
Phase. Force
Activity.
I.
Approach.

Type
Of Support
Required.
Counter battery.
Deep support.

II.

Assault.

III.

Advance.

Close support.
Counter battery.
Close support.
Deep support.
Counter battery.

Priority Targets.

Observation.

Batteries.
Major defences.
Reserves.
Beach defences.
Batteries.
Opportunity targets.
Strong points.
Counter attacks.
Batteries.

Air.
Ship.
Ship.
Air.
Shore.
Air.
Ship.

The continuation of Annex C lays out the methods for observation and fire control and
location of targets. Prior to an engagement, ships would receive precise bombardment targets.
With the support of aerial spotters and then Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCP), ships were to
neutralize or destroy its prearranged targets. Once prearranged targets were destroyed, SFCP
and aerial spotters were responsible for identifying targets of opportunity, and then requesting
fire from their supporting ship. Every aspect of naval bombardment was laid out in the general
order in great detail, finally creating a doctrine for naval gunfire support.
The “Allied Naval Assault Gunnery Instructions” from 1944 detail the procedure for
Shore Fire Control Parties as updated for the Normandy Invasion. The SFCP consisted of: one
Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO); one artillery officer as Naval Gunfire Spotter (NGS);
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one Liaison Sergeant; four Radio Operators (code); two Radio Operators (voice); three Privates,
basic; and two Privates, wiremen. 60
Going ashore with the initial infantry wave were the NGS, liaison sergeant, one voice
radio operator and two wiremen who were equipped with one SCR609 transmitter and receiver,
field glasses, wire equipment, maps and photographs. Once this initial group was ashore and
able to make observations, they were to set up the SCR609 and contact their support ship, which
was equipped with SCR608 receiver. In the next wave the naval officer, two code radio
operators, one voice radio operator, and two basic privates would land. They carried the
SCR284 receiver and transmitter as well as maps and photographs. Upon contact with both ship
and forward observer, the naval officer relayed fire missions from the forward NGS to the
supporting ship. Once possible, the final section of the SFCP would land with one SCR284
mounted on a 1 ½ ton truck. Consisting of the final two code radio operators and basic private,
this echelon would report to the NGLO as needed. If the second wave did not include a truck,
the second truck would land when possible after the third group. The Naval Gunfire Liaison
Officer was attached to a direct support artillery battalion headquarters and to the Division
Artillery Headquarter of the Army. The foremost responsibility of the Naval Gunfire Liaison
Officer was to forward requests for fire and intelligence to the SFCP and to coordinate naval
gunfire for maximum efficiency.
Within just about a year’s time, the Navy and Marine Corps had revolutionized thinking
about fire support for amphibious landings. When officers realized that aerial bombing would
not be enough to defeat a fortified landing site, they changed doctrine. Naval shore
bombardment went through rapid change. With this new doctrine, ships such as the Texas were
60
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given a new purpose in war. For the Texas, her first real test of this new naval assault doctrine
would be the most famous amphibious landing of the Second World War, the invasion of France.
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10: The Invasion of France
The invasion of France was divided into two parts: Operation Neptune, the cross Channel
phase of the invasion and Operation Overlord, to secure the Normandy beachhead. Command of
Operation Neptune went to British Admiral Bertram Ramsey, RN. Organized into five
bombardment groups, three American battleships and two British battleships were ordered to
provide bombardment along with twenty-five American, British, Dutch, French and Polish
cruisers, destroyers, monitors, and sloops of war. The April 1944 version of the Operation
Neptune Naval Orders laid out instructions for the bombarding forces on D-day:
Object
2. The object of the naval bombardment is to assist in ensuring the safe and
timely arrival of our forces by the engagement of hostile coastal defences, and to
support the assault and subsequent operations ashore.
This will involve the following tasks:
(a) neutralisation of coast defence and inland batteries capable of bringing
fire to bear on the assault beaches or sea approaches until each battery
is captured or destroyed,
(b) neutralisation or destruction of beach defences during the final
approach and assault,
(c) support of the army after the assault by the engagement of mobile
batteries, counter-attacking formations, defended areas, etc.,
particularly during that period when the army artillery is not fully
deployed. 61
For Operation Neptune, the “Texas operated as a unit of the Bombardment Group (TG
124.9) under command of Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant, U.S. Navy, in Texas; of Assault Force “O”
(TF 124) Rear Admiral J.L. Hall, Jr., U.S. Navy; of the Western Naval Task Force (TF 122),

61

“Operation Neptune – Naval Operation Orders,” Commander, Eleventh Amphibious Force
(COM11THPHIBFOR); Operations Plans and Orders and Other Records Relating to Operation NEPTUNE, 19431944; Records of the Naval Operating Forces, Record Group: 313: National Archives at College Park, College Park,
MD.

29

Rear Admiral A.G. Kirk, U.S. Navy, NCWTF.” 62 The specific mission given to the Texas
demonstrated the advanced doctrine of naval shore bombardment. The mission “was to
neutralize and destroy the 155mm casemated battery (Army Target Number 1) on Pointe du Hoc,
east of Grandcamps on the Bay of the Seine, to permit the First and Twenty-Ninth Infantry
Divisions of the First U.S. Army to land on the beaches east and west of the Carentan estuary.” 63
On the night of June 5, the Texas as the flagship of the Western Task Force began the
slow journey from her anchorage just off of Plymouth to her fighting location. Anchoring in the
Western Fire Support Channel west of Omaha Beach at 0300 on June 6, she remained silent until
0441, when she moved into position to begin bombardment. 64 Stopping at 0530 and lying to in
her bombardment position, the Texas turned her port broadside to the beach. Due to a projected
tidal current change expected during the bombardment period, she did not anchor, but kept
position with her engines. At 0550, positioned roughly 13,000 yards bearing 030° from Pointe
du Hoc, the main and secondary batteries opened fired on pre-arranged targets. 65
The main target for the Texas was a coastal defense battery of six 155mm guns, two of
which were casemated at Pointe du Hoc on the west end of Omaha beach. Located on a cliff
one-hundred feet in height, these six guns had a range of twenty-five thousand yards, and could
bombard both Omaha and Utah beaches. This battery was given special attention in the invasion
planning as planners believed the destruction of this battery would be essential to the success of
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the invasion. It was bombed three times by American bomber forces prior to June 6, and before
H-hour on that same day the Texas fired roughly 250 shells into the Pointe du Hoc battery.
Under the command of American Army Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder, USA,
several hundred men from the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions of the United States Army were
assigned the task of landing on the beach beneath the Pointe du Hoc cliff and then scaling the
cliff to capture the battery. After a delayed landing due to the sinking of one landing craft and a
navigation error, Rangers landed on the rocky shore and scaled the cliff. They found that the six
had been replaced by dummies made of telephone poles. As a result of heavy aerial
bombardment by Allied bombers, the Germans had moved the guns inland before June 6.
Moving inland the Rangers found four of the six guns and destroyed them with the use of
thermite grenades, finally accomplishing their mission.
Landing in a Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) in the seventh wave on Omaha
Beach, Collier’s correspondent Ernest Hemingway witnessed the power of the Texas’ 14-inch
guns first hand. Of the experience he wrote:
Those of our troops who were not wax-gray with seasickness… were
watching the Texas with looks of surprise and happiness. Under the steel helmets
they looked like pikemen of the Middle Ages to whose aid in battle had suddenly
come some strange and unbelievable monster.
There would be a flash like a blast furnace from the 14-inch guns of the
Texas that would lick far out from the ship. Then the yellow-brown smoke would
cloud and, with the smoke still rolling, the concussion and the report would hit us,
jarring the men’s helmets. It struck your near ear like a punch with a heavy, dry
glove.
Then up on the green rise of a hill that now showed clearly as we moved in
would spout two tall black fountains of earth and smoke.
“Look what they’re doing to those Germans,” I leaned forward to hear a G.I.
say above the roar of the motor. “I guess there won’t be a man alive there,” he
said happily.
That is the only thing I remember hearing a G.I. say all that morning. 66
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Firing ceased at 0630, and the Texas stood by for call fire and any targets of opportunity.
In the forty minutes which she spent shelling her targets, the Texas expended 155 armor piercing
(AP) rounds and 117 high capacity (HC) rounds from her main battery and ninety-one HC
rounds and ninety-nine common rounds from her 5-inch secondary battery. Two-hundred-fiftyfive of her total 272 main battery rounds were fired on the 155mm gun positions at Pointe du
Hoc. The other seventeen were fired on a fortified position. The secondary battery focused on
enemy “pillbox anti-tank guns and machine guns.” 67 The action report remarks that based on
reports by air aerial spotters the gunfire support from the Texas produced excellent neutralization
results. 68
Spotting for the Texas’ secondary battery was carried out by the ship’s own fire control
from the foretop. Spotting for the main battery was initially provided by pilots from the RAF,
flying Spitfires. The action report states that:
Spotting by the Spitfire pilots was generally excellent and their often amusing
comments were much enjoyed. They showed great keenness and efficiency in
locating targets of opportunity although the zeal of one pilot nearly proved fatal.
His strafing of an enemy command car cost him some flak damage to his plane
and necessitated his quick return to his home base. 69
Once available, SFCP spotting was said to be “satisfactory when used” and that
“communication was generally good.” 70 There were, however, problems with visual
communication between the SFCP and the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc, which the action report
claims was costly to the Rangers. The Rangers landed forty-five minutes late, which gave the
Germans time to recover from the initial bombing and put up a very strong resistance. In his
action report for the invasion, Captain Baker of the Texas remarked that had they, or one of the
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destroyers, known that the Rangers landing at Pointe du Hoc were so delayed, they could have
continued to provide covering fire in that period to prevent the German troops from regrouping.
The Texas remained in the Channel off Normandy until 17 June with the exception of the
period of 9-11 June when she returned to Plymouth to replenish ammunition. During this time
she supported the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc, resupplying the men on shore and acting as a
hospital, providing medical care, and even surgery to wounded Rangers. She also took on
twenty-seven prisoners of war. During the period of 6-17 June, the Texas turned her main
battery on roughly two dozen targets, expending 442 14” MK 19 HC shells, 248 14” MK20-1 AP
shells, 99 5” common shells and 173 5” HC shells. 71
Later action off of the French coast at Cherbourg challenged the Texas. On 25 June she
was tasked with bombarding coastal defenses in the Cherbourg area and providing gunfire
support while the US Seventh Corps attacked the port from inland. 72 Specifically the Texas was
ordered to bombard the following pinpoint targets:
1. 155mm Battery (6 guns), casemated, at Grid 391275 on Pointe du
Barfleur.
2. 150mm Battery (4 guns), Grid 304273.
3. 105mm Battery (2 guns), Grid 320291.
4. 105mm Battery (4 guns), Grid 205218.
5. Targets of opportunity. 73
However, due to late changes in H-hour times, and the uncertainty of locations, plans were
changed and all prearranged fire was cancelled. Fire would only be delivered at the request of
the Army or to return fire from coastal batteries. 74
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Reaching the fire support area by 0950 and finding the initial targets already destroyed,
the Texas and Arkansas, screened by destroyers, maneuvered in the area, awaiting orders to fire.
At 1229 the bombardment group came under fire from coastal batteries. Shells splashed down
around the ships, but the fire was concentrated on the Texas. With a spotter plane in the air, the
destroyers laid a smoke screen which reduced the accuracy of the enemy fire. By 1244 the Texas
began to fire on targets, and within less than ten minutes enemy gunfire was decreased. At 1314
the Texas ran through the smoke screen, invoking another round from the coastal defenses, and
although the Texas took evasive action, the coastal batteries scored a direct hit on the conning
tower at 1316. Damage was severe, but it was not a lethal hit and the Texas stayed in the
action. 75 Ordered to increase their range to 18,000 yards, the Texas and Arkansas moved out and
continued to fire on the shore batteries from that increased range, coming under heavy crossfire
again until they were ordered to retire at 1500. Returning to Portsmouth, the Texas had
expended 206 rounds of 14-inch shells. At 1447 Central Station reported to the conning tower
on the Texas that an unexploded shell had been found in the forward section of the ship. In an
officer’s room between frames eighteen and nineteen, the 240mm HC shell had amazingly not
detonated. 76
Spotting for the action off of Cherbourg was a mix of SFCP, spotter planes, and the
ship’s own directors due to the chaotic nature of the action. One round of six HC shells was
determined a miss, and the action report claims that the “plane was in error as to map
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reference….” 77 Further details on spotting for this engagement are vague in the action reports,
and it is not made clear whether the planes were the ship’s own or provided by Allied air forces.
After undergoing repairs to the ship from damage sustained off of Cherbourg, the Texas
sailed to the Mediterranean to cover the invasion of southern France. Following that invasion,
the Texas returned to New York, where she underwent an overhaul in the fall of 1944. After her
overhaul and a brief shakedown, she sailed for the western Pacific. A veteran of three
amphibious landings, the Texas added to her experience in providing naval gunfire support by
covering the landings on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. When peace was finally secured in August of
1945, the Texas had bombarded the shores of northern and southern France, North Africa, Iwo
Jima and Okinawa. She had expended over 9,000 rounds from her main and secondary batteries,
earned five Battle Stars, and helped revolutionize the use of battleships in the American Navy. 78
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11: Discussion of Naval Gunfire During the Invasion of France
After Allied forces secured the invasion beaches in northern France and began to fight
their way eastward, there was not a great deal of thought or discussion given to the naval
bombardment of the landings. Samuel Eliot Morison remarks in his volume covering the
invasion that neither the Army nor the Navy made any attempts to check the results of the
bombardment. 79 Adrian Lewis explains that the short bombardment period allowed for
Normandy was a result of Army planners’ belief in the element of surprise and lack of
appreciation of naval gunfire. At both Sicily and Salerno, the Army ignored the
recommendations of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, who took on the task of adapting the
doctrine of the Marine Corps to the European and Mediterranean theaters. Hewitt attempted “to
change the Army’s concept for the amphibious assaults,” especially concerning naval gunfire
support. 80 Hewitt was not successful in his attempt, and despite the complaints of naval officers
involved in the Normandy invasion, the Army continued to not utilize naval gunfire to its full
potential.
Admiral Kirk claimed that the “First Army became so enamored of naval gunfire support
that he had to warn General Bradley not to overdo it; the naval guns were being worn out….” 81
Morison describes how many men who landed on the beach praised the effort of the naval
bombardment. After inspecting defenses at Omaha, Colonel S.B. Mason, chief of staff of the
First Infantry Division, wrote to Rear Admiral Hall that he was “firmly convinced that our
supporting naval fire got us in; that without that gunfire we positively could not have crossed the
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beaches.” 82 And while there is an argument that not enough gunfire support was given on Dday, there one example which shows that the psychological effects of the naval gunfire support
were invaluable. Morison and an October 1944 review of the amphibious operations during the
Invasion of France quote a German military journal on the power of naval guns:
The fire curtain provided by the guns of the Navy so far proved to be one of the
best trump cards of the Anglo-U.S. invasion Armies. It may be that the part
played by the Fleet was more decisive than that of the air forces because its fire
was better aimed and unlike the bomber formations it had not to confine itself to
short bursts of fire. 83
Morison further emphasized the point of the psychological effect of heavy naval gunfire on
enemy forces by quoting several German military leaders, as well as Adolf Hitler on the impact of
the naval bombardment, and specifically to the Germans, the impact of the presence and
firepower of the battleships: 84
Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt: “Besides the interference of the Air Forces,
the fire of your battleships was a main factor in hampering our counterattacks.
This was a big surprise, both in its range and effect.”
General Blumentritt “remarked that Allied Army officers who interrogated him
after the war did not seem to realize the serious effect naval gunfire had on the
German defenses.”
Generalfeldmarschall Rommel on 10 June: “Our operation in Normandy are
tremendously hampered, and in some places even rendered impossible, by the
following factors: (a) The immensely powerful, at time overwhelming, superiority
of the enemy air force. . . (b) The effect of the heavy naval guns. Up to 640 guns
have been used. The effect is so immense that no operation of any kind is
possible in the area commanded by this rapid-fire artillery, either by infantry or
tanks.”
Adolf Hitler: “… in his directive of 29 June, ‘made it clear that he regarded the
destruction of the enemy’s battleships as of outstanding importance.’”
Despite all of the praise for Allied naval bombardment on D-day by both Allied and
German military, the October 1944 review of the amphibious operations is critical of the
82
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bombardment. The overall recommendation set out in this document is that a longer period of
bombardment is necessary to reduce defenses on beaches. The commander of the Western Task
Force even recommended that Army officers should be given a better understanding of the
“dependability and accuracy of naval fire.” 85 The commander of Assault Force “O” points out
one of the biggest needs in regards to naval bombardment: an establishment of some type of
measurement of the necessary amount of gunfire required to neutralize targets. For example, on
Omaha beach, where 98,000 were landing, a total weight of rounds expended during the assault
was 1,295.8 tons. 86 On Kwajalein Island, where assault troops numbered 22,000, 3,964 tons of
projectiles were fired onto the landing beaches, and casualties were much lower. 87 This analysis
also gives ratios for the two landings: troops landed, Omaha versus Kwajalein was 4:1; defensive
strength of assaulted positions approximately 3:1; naval gunfire support was 1:3. It is further
noted that no magical mathematical equation existed for figuring the amount of naval gunfire
support necessary, but the above mentioned ratios showed the possibility that increased
bombardment could have resulted in fewer casualties, and possibly, a shorter period of time
required to secure the beaches.
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12: Conclusion
After the Operation Neptune, the Texas participated in the invasion of southern France
(Operation Dragoon). After a brief overhaul and shakedown cruise, the Texas made her way to
the Pacific via the Panama Canal and Hawaii. By January of 1945 her decks were laden with
antiaircraft guns for defense against Japanese aircraft, and the experienced crew was prepared to
provide gunfire support for Marine landings at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. 88 By the invasion of
France, doctrine for naval gunfire support for amphibious landings had been standardized for the
navy. The Texas covered the Pacific landings in the same way it had covered the beaches of
Normandy. When the war ended in August of 1945, the Texas was in the Philippines. By that
time, she had fired over four-thousand 14-inch shells in support of amphibious landings. Not
once were those guns trained on another ship.
From September through December of 1945, the Texas participated in the return of
troops to the United States in an operation known as MAGIC CARPET. Returning from the
Pacific in October, the Texas carried home troops from Okinawa. Four MAGIC CARPET trips
between Hawaii and ports in California were completed by the end of December, by which time
the Texas had returned over four-thousand troops to America. Deactivation of the Texas began
in December, and the Texas was sent to the Norfolk Navy Yard in Virginia. Assigned to the
reserve fleet in June of 1946, she remained up at Hawkins Point, Baltimore, until March of 1948.
After lobbying from Texas state officials and citizens, the United States Navy agreed to give the
ship to the state of Texas where she could be preserved at the San Jacinto Battlegrounds, outside
of Houston. The Texas was decommissioned on April 21, 1948, after forty-four years of service
and handed over to the Battleship Texas Commission, to be preserved as the first permanent
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museum ship in the United States, as a lasting memorial to the United States Navy in both World
Wars.
American battleships entered the war in the role for which they had been designed: to
fight great ship to ship engagements at sea. War Plan Orange had called for a decisive fleet
action, but that fleet action evolved into carrier, not battleship, action. War Plan Orange also
called for the buildup of bases in the Pacific, and with the Japanese in possession of many
strategically important islands, those islands had to be taken by force. Landing forces needed
protection during invasions, and this provided a need which the oldest ships of the fleet,
Arkansas, New York, Texas and Nevada could fill. The US Navy and Marines used every
engagement to improve on doctrine. In just two years the weak naval gunfire doctrine of 1942
was developed into a detailed and efficient doctrine.
Speed and shorter firing ranges were irrelevant when shelling an enemy beach. Most of
the handicaps that made America’s old battleships obsolescent in comparison with its newest
ships were irrelevant when facing a fortified enemy beach. The ability of the American forces to
repurpose its resources and look past traditional roles for ships such as the Texas proved
instrumental to American victory in the Second World War.
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Appendix B

Ammunition Expended by the Texas during World War Two.
Main Battery (14-inch/45 caliber)
Port Lyautey, North Africa…………………………………..…………………………273 rounds
Normandy……………………………………………………………………………….891 rounds
Southern France………………………………………………………………………...172 rounds
Iwo Jima………………………………………………………………………………...923 rounds
Okinawa ……………………………………………………………………………...2,019 rounds
TOTAL 4,278 rounds
Secondary Battery (5-inch/51 caliber)
Port Lyautey, North Africa…………………………………..……………………………6 rounds
Normandy……………………………………………………………………………….272 rounds
Southern France…………………………………………………………………………...0 rounds
Iwo Jima………………………………………………………………………………...967 rounds
Okinawa ……………………………………………………………………………...2,640 rounds
TOTAL 3,885 rounds
Antiaircraft Battery (3-inch/50 caliber)
Southern France………………………………………………………………………….90 rounds
Iwo Jima……………………………………………………………………………….......4 rounds
Okinawa ……………………………………………………………………………......490 rounds
TOTAL 584 rounds
Machine Gun Battery (40 millimeter)
Normandy……………………………………………………………………………….192 rounds
Southern France……………………………………………………………..………….429 rounds
Iwo Jima……………………………………………………………………….……...3,100 rounds
TOTAL 3,721 rounds
Machine Gun Battery (40 millimeter)
Okinawa………………………………………………………………………………2,275 rounds
TOTAL 2,275 rounds

This data was taken directly from Egan, Robert S., Arnold S. Lott, LCDR, USN (Ret.), and
Robert F. Sumrall, HTC, USNR. USS Texas (BB35), p. 47. Numbers may vary according to
different sources.
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Appendix C

USS Texas Armament Changes, 1914-1944.

Guns

Mounting

14”/45
Mk. 3
5”/51
Mk. 13
3”/50
Mk. 21
3”/50
Mk. 21
40mm
Mk. 2
1.1”
Mk. 1
20mm
Mk. 10
.50 cal
21”
Torpedo
Tube
Mk.3

Twin
Mk. 12
Single
Mk. 13
Single
Mk. 13
Single
Mk. 22
Quad
Mk. 2
Quad
Mk. 2
Single
Mk. 4
Single
Single,
Submerged

March Sept. Sept. Jan. Dec. June Aug. July Oct. Dec.
1914 1917 1927 1941 1941 1942 1942 1943 1944 1944
10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

21

16

16

14

14

14

6

6

6

6

-

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

8

8

10

10

10

10

10

10

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

10

10

10

-

-

-

4

4

4

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

16

16

38

38

42

44

-

-

-

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

4

4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

From Egan, Robert S., Arnold S. Lott, LCDR, USN (Ret.), and Robert F. Sumrall, HTC, USNR.
USS Texas (BB35), p. 45.
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Appendix D

Map from the National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland.
Miscellaneous; U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Historical Section, Records Re; Operations Overlord
and Neptune, 1942-1945; Records of the Naval Operating Forces, Record Group: 313; Box 3,
Folder 7: NACP.
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